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RESUM
L’aproximació a l’evolució centrada en el gen o del gen egoista aparentment entra en con-
flicte amb l’observació que la cooperació és freqüent en les interaccions socials humanes i 
també es pot reconèixer en animals no humans . Sense cooperació no haurien pogut sor-
gir les unitats evolutives de nivells superiors . Aquí resumim el pensament evolutiu actu-
al sobre com poden evolucionar la cooperació i l’altruisme . A més, discutim els resultats 
dels experiments de la teoria de jocs per estudiar les interaccions socials que indiquen que 
els humans no s’ajusten a les prediccions de l’equilibri de Nash «racional» . Aquests resul-
tats són de gran interès per als biòlegs i científics socials, especialment si es desitja tenir un 
marc de referència comú per entendre com sorgeix la sociabilitat .
Paraules clau: altruisme, cooperació, teoria de jocs, nivells de selecció, transicions evo-
lutives principals .
SUMMARY
The gene-centred or selfish-gene approach to evolution apparently conflicts with the ob-
servation that cooperation is commonplace in human social interactions, and can also be 
recognized in non-human animals . Without cooperation, higher-level units of evolution 
could not have emerged . Here we summarize current evolutionary thinking on how coop-
eration and altruism can evolve . We also discuss the results reached by game theoretic ex-
periments for studying social interactions, which indicate that humans do not conform to 
Nash equilibrium (“rational”) predictions . These results are of wide interest to biologists 
and social scientists, particularly if we want to have a common framework to understand 
how sociality arises .
214  M. sAntos i E. szAtHMáRy
INTRODUCTION
The catchy phrase “survival of the fittest” 
is a metaphor widely used in popular liter-
ature to stress the idea that fierce competi-
tion prevails in the natural world, and has 
been taken (erroneously) as a short descrip-
tion of the Darwinian theory of evolution 
by natural selection . Although Darwin did 
think of natural selection as a process that 
allows the evolution of traits that directly 
and solely benefit the individual possess-
ing them (e .g ., sharp teeth, high speed, vis-
ual acuity, warning coloration, etc .), he al-
so occasionally considered that characters 
may be selected for because they are ad-
vantageous to the “community” or the fam-
ily . Thus, in the Origin of Species Darwin 
evokes the idea that certain instincts that 
lead to the death of the individual (e .g ., the 
instinct that drives the bee to sting and thus 
to die) could have evolved by natural selec-
tion because they were “useful to the com-
munity” (Darwin, 1859) . In the Descent of 
Man a similar idea is used to explain the de-
velopment of certain moral virtues, such as 
courage, obedience and faithfulness (Dar-
win, 1871, p . 166):
“It must not be forgotten that although 
a high standard of morality gives but a 
slight or no advantage to each individual 
man and his children over the other men 
of the same tribe, yet that an advance-
ment in the standard of morality and an 
increase in the number of well-endowed 
men will certainly give an immense ad-
vantage to one tribe over another . There 
can be no doubt that a tribe including 
many members who, from possessing in 
a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fi-
delity, obedience, courage, and sympa-
thy, were always ready to give aid to each 
other and to sacrifice themselves for the 
common good, would be victorious over 
most tribes; and this would be natural se-
lection” .
Therefore, the typical notion laypeople 
have about Darwin’s theory, in the sense 
that it provides a justification for any be-
havior that promotes selfishness and un-
dermines moral standards, is simply wrong . 
Having said this, however, it must be ac-
knowledged that Darwin’s concept of selec-
tion was mainly individualistic and he nev-
er discussed how important the selection 
among groups (“tribes”) could have been in 
shaping the history of life . The social insect 
case can be mentioned here because the ad-
vantage to the family is mentioned .
From the preceding paragraphs it is clear 
that the evolution of cooperation contrasts 
sharply with the concept of selection for 
traits that solely benefit the individual pos-
sessing them . Cooperation here is under-
stood as a behavior that involves an action 
performed by one individual that benefits one 
or more other members, embedded in a situa-
tion that poses a dilemma for the individual en-
gaged in a social interaction . Facing a social 
dilemma, when should a person cooperate? 
When should a person be selfish? Should 
we punish Russia for its hostile act against 
Georgia? (Admittedly, this is a bit of a prob-
lem since now we know that the Russian 
aggression was provoked by the Georgians 
and the initial reaction of many newspa-
pers was to overlook that fact .)
Key words: altruism, cooperation, game theory, levels of selection, major evolutionary 
transitions .
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PLAYING THE GAME
An intuitive understanding in these 
types of situations can be obtained by us-
ing a particular game called the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma . In its classical form, the version 
of this game goes as follows (e .g . Rice, 2004) . 
Two people are suspected of having com-
mitted a joint crime . The suspects are con-
fined to different rooms and cannot talk to 
each other . The police do not have sufficient 
evidence to convince a jury . The state attor-
ney offers each of the suspects a deal: if one 
testifies for the prosecution and confesses 
(“defects”) against the other and the other 
remains silent, the betrayer goes free and 
the silent accomplice receives the full sen-
tence of ten years . If both confess, they will 
each receive seven years . If neither of them 
confesses, then both will go free after one 
year in prison for a minor charge because 
nothing can be proved . This dilemma is 
represented by the following matrix, where 
the rows refer to the action (i .e ., remain si-
lent or confess) chosen by one prisoner (say 
P1) and the columns to the action taken by 
the other prisoner (say P2):
Prisoner P2
Remain si-
lent
Confess
Prisoner P1
Remain si-
lent
P1 = –1,  
P2 = –1
P1 = –10, 
P2 = 0
Confess
P1 = 0,  
P2 = –10
P1 = –7, 
P2 = –7
Negative numbers obviously signify that 
a convict loses years of their life in jail ac-
cording to each other’s decision . How 
should the prisoners act? A formal ap-
proach to the problem is to use game theo-
ry, which has become the basic framework 
to study situations that involve strategic in-
teractions . Assume for instance that you are 
prisoner P1 . The game can be analyzed by 
considering your best strategy against the 
decision taken by prisoner P2 . If he remains 
silent, it is best for you to confess and go 
free (P1 = 0, P2 = –10) . If he confesses, you al-
so better confess to avoid a longer sentence 
(P1 = –7, P2 = –7) . Therefore, no matter what 
he does, the best strategy for you is to con-
fess . A similar reasoning applies to pris-
oner P2, thus the best strategy is always to 
confess although it is clear that by doing so, 
both prisoners will suffer a sentence that is 
six years longer than that obtained if both 
remain silent . The strategy confess-con-
fess defines a “Nash equilibrium”: namely, 
a strategy profile such that each prisoner’s 
play is the best response to that of the other . 
Cooperating (remain silent) is strictly dom-
inated by defecting (confess) .
The fact that the rational pursuit of indi-
vidual interest apparently drives both part-
ners to an inferior profile helps account for 
the enduring interest in the Prisoner’s Di-
lemma game . The conclusion appears to 
violate the gut feeling intuition that inter-
actions among individuals usually lead 
to mutually beneficial outcomes; in other 
words, the two players in the Prisoner’s Di-
lemma game should apparently cooperate 
to minimize their mutual loss (remain si-
lent and both of them will spend only one 
year in prison), but this would not be a log-
ical decision . What is the significance of all 
this to biology anyway?
It turns out that this problem is as old as 
the origin of life itself [“cooperators since life 
began” is the title of an insightful review by 
Queller (1997) in The Quarterly Review of Bi-
ology] . The evolution of biological complexi-
ty often requires the coordinate action (“co-
operation”) of different parts that function 
to ensure the survival and reproduction of 
the whole . Thus, earlier replicating mole-
cules had to cooperate to form the first cells . 
During the emergence of multicellular or-
ganisms, single cells had to cooperate and 
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today they exist only as parts of a larger in-
dividual . Eusociality (found primarily in 
social insects but also in some other organ-
isms) is a level of social organization where 
members cooperate in brood care, and are 
separated into reproductive and non-repro-
ductive castes . On a larger scale, humans 
cooperate in raising states and countries 
that they themselves engage in coopera-
tive commercial and communication ac-
tivities . Yet, our understanding of the ori-
gin and maintenance of cooperation at any 
level is fraught with difficulties . Genes in 
an organism sometimes “disagree” and, 
for example, can have a beneficial effect on 
females but a detrimental one on males . 
Cancers are selfish cell lineages, namely, 
clones of cells in a multicellular organism 
that have evolved a higher rate of division 
compared to other non-cancerous lineag-
es . And the Achilles’ heel in human co-
operation was clearly appreciated by Tho-
mas Hobbes when he wrote in the Leviathan 
(1651, chap . xvii):
“For the laws of nature, as justice, equi-
ty, modesty, mercy, and, in sum, doing to 
others as we would be done to, of them-
selves, without the terror of some power 
to cause them to be observed, are contra-
ry to our natural passions, that carry us 
to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like . 
And covenants, without the sword, are 
but words and of no strength to secure 
a man at all . Therefore, notwithstanding 
the laws of nature (which every one hath 
then kept, when he has the will to keep 
them, when he can do it safely), if there 
be no power erected, or not great enough 
for our security, every man will and may 
lawfully rely on his own strength and art 
for caution against all other men” .
In other words, Hobbes argued that in-
dividuals would find it mutually beneficial 
to agree in order to restrain their “natural” 
tendencies toward deception . However, af-
ter the social contract any party would ex-
perience the incentive to violate the agree-
ment and eventually would do so to enjoy 
an immediate benefit . The only satisfactory 
remedy to this situation of affairs, accord-
ing to Hobbes, is the introduction of a co-
ercive state with a monopoly on the use of 
force to which individuals would submit to 
voluntarily .
What humans normally do when faced 
with the Prisoner’s Dilemma game? This is-
sue can be explored by using experimental 
methods that allow the study of behavior 
in situations where different considerations 
may be controlled for . Notwithstanding the 
predictions suggested by game theory anal-
ysis, the results of various experiments that 
have been carried out so far show unam-
biguously that a majority of subjects (about 
60%) achieved mutual cooperation . This is 
jointly better for the players than mutual 
defection, although defection is always in-
dividually superior . When Nash first heard 
about these results, he wrote the follow-
ing note (Field, 2001, p . 5): “I would have 
thought them (the players) more rational” . 
This comment raises the important issue 
about what it means for humans to be ra-
tional .
EXPLAINING COOPERATION
Given the problem of cooperation, how 
can cooperative behaviors arise and be 
maintained? Conventional (individualis-
tic) Darwinian theory seems unable to re-
ally explain why one individual should pay 
a cost in terms of fitness in order to bene-
fit another individual . The reason is simple: 
an altruistic individual will leave less off-
spring than its selfish counterparts, so any 
inherited tendency to be altruistic will de-
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crease in frequency and eventually disap-
pear from the population . Apparently, the 
only way out to explain the evolution of 
cooperation is to restore the idea of selec-
tion between groups, as Darwin put for-
ward . But in the 1960s a few scientists chal-
lenged most biologists’ positive attitude 
towards the importance of group selection, 
and stressed that natural selection was in-
trinsically selfish and that cooperative acts 
could only evolve under restrictive condi-
tions (Hamilton, 1964; Williams, 1966) .
Before explaining the solution offered by 
Hamilton (1964) for the evolution of altru-
ism, it pays to summarize here the dissatis-
faction felt by some theoreticians with the 
idea of group selection (for a comprehen-
sive account, see Wilson and Wilson, 2007) . 
The following passage by Williams (1966, 
pp . 92-93) gives a flavor of the intellectu-
al holes in the theory of group selection at 
that time:
“This book is a rejoinder to those who 
have questioned the adequacy of the tra-
ditional (individualistic) model of natural 
selection to explain evolutionary adapta-
tion… Many biologists have implied, and 
a moderate number have explicitly main-
tained, that groups of interacting individ-
uals may be adaptively organized in such 
a way that individual interests are com-
promised by a functional subordination 
to group interests .
It is universally conceded by those who 
have seriously concerned themselves 
with this problem […] that such group-
related adaptations must be attributed to 
the natural selection of alternative groups 
of individuals and that the natural selec-
tion of alternative alleles within popu-
lations will be opposed to this develop-
ment . I am in entire agreement with the 
reasoning behind this conclusion . Only 
by a theory of between-group selection 
could we achieve a scientific explana-
tion of group-related adaptations . How-
ever, I would question the premises on 
which the reasoning is based . Chapters 5 
to 8 will be primarily a defense of the the-
sis that group-related adaptations do not, 
in fact, exist . A group in this discussion 
should be understood to mean something 
other than a family and to be composed 
of individuals that need not be closely re-
lated” .
Here Williams punches in the so-called 
traditional view of group selection . Togeth-
er with various theoretical analysis [in par-
ticular, Maynard Smith’s (1964) “haystack 
model” and latter, more refined models (e .g . 
Eshel, 1972)], it was clear that traits that are 
disadvantageous to the individual, but that 
lower the probability of group extinction 
(recall Darwin’s paragraph in the Introduc-
tion), can persevere only if the population is 
structured into extremely isolated groups . 
This result suggests that the likelihood of 
successful group selection is small .
Note that at the end of the preceding 
quotation Williams wrote, “A group […] 
should be understood […] to be composed 
of individuals that need not be closely relat-
ed .” This point is important and has been 
hidden in some recent theoretical analyses 
of group selection (see below) . In 1932 and 
again in 1955, J . B . S . Haldane, one of the 
founders on the modern genetic theory of 
evolution, pointed out that an individual’s 
genes could also be (indirectly) multiplied 
through the actions performed by such in-
dividual in favoring the differential surviv-
al and reproduction of collateral relatives 
(e .g ., siblings, nieces, and cousins) to suffi-
cient degree (Haldane, 1932, 1955) . This in-
itial insight was expanded by William D . 
(Bill) Hamilton (born August 1, 1936; died 
March 7, 2000), one of the most influential 
Darwinian thinkers of our time . Hamilton 
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wondered: how natural selection can main-
tain (altruistic) traits that, even if advan-
tageous for the population, apparently re-
duce the number of their carriers below 
their shares in the population? The answer 
he gave came from extending the classical 
population genetics theory to cover those 
situations where the altruistic behaviour 
is directed towards genetic relatives: an in-
herited behaviour is selected for in a popu-
lation if and only if it results in an increase 
in the number of genes identical by descent 
(i .e ., those gene copies that are shared be-
tween relatives according to Mendelian 
rules) to those of the individual that per-
forms the behaviour . Thus, whenever the 
altruistic action is directed toward relatives 
the behavior can spread throughout the 
population by natural selection . The con-
ditions under which the behavior increases 
are encapsulated in Hamilton’s (1964) rule 
[we are sympathetic with Hawking’s “fault” 
of including Einstein’s celebrated equation 
E = mc2 in his popular-science book A Brief 
History of Time (1988) and also include here 
the most famous inequality in evolutionary 
biology, which happens to have the same 
number of parameters]:
rb > c
where r is the coefficient of relatedness 
(roughly speaking, the probability of shar-
ing gene copies) between actor and recipi-
ent, b is the fitness benefit (offspring gain) 
provided to the recipient, and c is the re-
productive cost to the actor for providing 
benefits . In colloquial language, the rule 
states that it pays to risk your life if by per-
forming an action, you save the life of your 
two children . Any mother will surely agree 
with this, and the reasons for this are not 
only “psychological” . Haldane (1955) put 
it is this way: “I will risk death to save my 
child from a raging river if the odds are at 
least two to one that I will succeed (because 
she shares roughly half my genes); but I 
will jump in the river to save my cousin on-
ly if the odds favoring success are seven in 
eight (because she has only one-eight of 
my genes) . Trying to save my grandmoth-
er makes no sense at all because, being past 
child-bearing age, she can pass on none of 
my genes to the next generation .”
Hamilton’s rule to explain the evolution 
of altruistic traits became one of the cen-
tral dogmas of the modern theory of evo-
lution, and his approach is known as “kin 
selection” or “inclusive fitness theory” (al-
beit technically speaking these labels are 
not strictly equivalent) . Hamilton’s paper 
on “the genetical evolution of social be-
haviour” (1964) also became one of the 
most cited papers in all science (4,282 cita-
tions according to a recent search on Web 
of Science) . Due to the combined influence 
of Hamilton’s, Maynard Smith’s and Wil-
liams’ work, all previous explanations of 
social behaviors that have evolved because 
of their importance for the well-being of 
the group fell into widespread disrepute 
and were eradicated from the mainstream 
of evolutionary thinking . Group-selection 
became a taboo expression that has, how-
ever, not been expunged entirely from ev-
olutionary theory, and remains vindicat-
ed in some quarters although with several 
meanings . For instance, Sober and Wilson 
have been passionate supporters of group 
selection and have attacked in their book 
Unto Others (1998) the widespread consen-
sus that group selection is a negligible evo-
lutionary process .
However, the traditional view of group 
selection advocated in particular by Wil-
liams (1966) and Maynard Smith (1964), is 
not what Sober and Wilson had in mind . A 
more recent view of group selection is that 
populations are frequently subdivided in-
to small temporary groups, termed “struc-
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tured-deme” or “trait-group” models (Wil-
son 1975, 1979), and that the subdivision 
can result in group-mediated evolutionary 
change (Hamilton, 1975; Wilson, 1975) .
Figure 1 illustrates the “mating pool” 
mode of reproduction, where offspring 
genotypes at each generation are sampled 
from a common population and subdivid-
ed into temporary groups in which individ-
uals representing a finite sample from the 
pooled distribution reproduce in propor-
tion to their fitness . A single heritable trait 
(allele A) stimulates its bearer to provide 
a group benefit, and its eventual spread is 
conditional on the greater productivity of 
altruistic groups . But now things become 
(technically) complicated because differ-
ent definitions of altruism have been used 
throughout the literature . Hamilton con-
sistently defined altruism as a cooperative 
behavior that decreases the absolute fitness 
(i .e ., involves an absolute cost in terms of 
offspring production) of the individual that 
performs it . However, various authors (in-
cluding Sober and Wilson, 1998) refer to a 
given behavior as “altruistic” even if it de-
creases the relative fitness of the agent (i .e ., 
the cost in terms of offspring production is 
relative to the local group and not to the pop-
ulation as a whole) . This apparently harm-
less disparity in the definition of altruism 
has profound consequences on the even-
tual evolutionary fate of the behavior un-
der consideration (also in the eventual role 
of group selection to explaining human co-
operation; see Concluding Remarks) . Sober 
and Wilson’s argue that a behavior counts 
as altruistic if, first, within any group indi-
viduals that perform the behavior are less 
fit than those that do not; and second, the 
greater the proportion of individuals that 
perform the behavior in a given group, the 
greater the group’s fitness (i .e ., the greater 
the contribution of the group to the mat-
ing pool) . These conditions do not imply 
that “altruism” reduces the donor’s abso-
lute fitness; namely, they do not imply that 
the behavior is really altruistic . This is an 
important point, but the reasons for it are 
unfortunately somewhat too technical to 
be explained here and the interested reader 
can refer to Okasha (2006, pp . 192-197) for a 
lucid discussion .
On the other hand, Hamilton’s definition 
implies that a behavior is really altruistic 
and can evolve in a structured-deme mod-
el if and only if there is positive assortment 
for the benefits of altruism to fall preferen-
tially on other altruists (i .e ., altruists settle 
with altruists; Hamilton, 1975) . Positive as-
sortment guarantees altruist’s mutual aid 
and Hamilton’s inclusive fitness rule is re-
covered .
However, although assortative grouping 
may explain how altruism is sustained in 
the population it is not an explanation for 
its origin . It is important to avoid the “in-
verse genetic fallacy” (Field, 2001) . Name-
ly, that the inappropriate attribution of 
Figure 1. The “mating pool” mode of reproduction. At 
each generation, selection acts on groups of individuals 
(open and closed circles represent different genotypes) 
that contribute offspring to a common pool which again 
forms new groups before selection.
Group 1 Group 2 Group m
……….
Mating pool
……….
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mechanisms may be sustaining coopera-
tion to the explanation of its origin . The ini-
tial barrier to selection in Hamilton’s model 
arises because positive assortment is neg-
ligible when altruism is initially very rare . 
The barrier must be passed by a different 
mechanism (see Santos and Szathmáry, 
2008) .
LEVELS OF SELECTION
A particular illuminating formulation 
that can be used to understand the rela-
tive merits that individual and group selec-
tion mechanisms have on the evolution of 
cooperation is that of Price (1970, 1972) . His 
method involves a simple algebraic expres-
sion that describes a population’s evolution 
from one generation to another . Actually, 
Hamilton’s (1975) paper of group selection 
was fostered by Price’s idea, and included a 
section entitled “Levels of Selection” where 
Hamilton made use of Price’s equation for 
the first time to formally study a hierarchi-
cal approach to the operation of natural se-
lection (he assumed a mating pool mode 
of reproduction) . This approach has be-
come standard in evolutionary theory ev-
er since and can be generalized to an indef-
inite number of hierarchical levels, an issue 
that underlines many disputes about group 
selection (the debate of group selection has 
been characterized by perennial disagree-
ments over concepts and terminology) .
In the last years, there has been an ongo-
ing dispute on the equivalence of kin selec-
tion and levels of selection approaches for 
modeling social evolution . However, both 
approaches are indeed equivalent and the 
confusion, as shown by Bijma and Wade 
(2008), is partly caused by the fact that lev-
els of selection models tend to hide the re-
latedness component of response to selec-
tion, whereas kin selection models tend to 
hide the multilevel selection component of 
response to selection . Thus, kin selection 
does not work without multiple groups of 
kin .
A key empirical breakthrough in evolu-
tionary biology was to recognize that in-
dividual (selfish) organisms that adapt to 
the environment by natural selection orig-
inated as cooperative collectives that ex-
perienced a series of “transitions in indi-
viduality” (Buss, 1987) . In the biological 
progression from molecule to cell to body 
to species, the units at each level tend to be 
nested into ever more inclusive units: a tes-
tament of the importance of cooperation in 
the evolution of life on Earth . Using a tra-
ditional view of natural selection, it is hard 
to understand how this hierarchical organ-
ization—with potential conflicts between 
the different units (genes, chromosomes, 
organelles, cells, etc .; see Burt and Triv-
ers, 2006)—has evolved . From the growing 
body of work on “major evolutionary tran-
sitions” it has become clear that a multi-lev-
el selection scenario is central to explaining 
those transitions .
In their book The Major Transitions in Ev-
olution, Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 
(1995, p . 3) wrote:
“Our thesis is that the increase (in biolog-
ical complexity) has depended on a small 
number of major transitions in the way in 
which genetic information is transmitted 
between generations . Some of these tran-
sitions were unique: for example, the or-
igin of the eukaryotes from the prokary-
otes […] . Other transitions, such as the 
origin of multicellularity, and of animal 
societies, have occurred several times in-
dependently” .
And on page 8 they state:
“The transitions must be explained in 
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terms of immediate selective advantage 
to individual replicators: we are commit-
ted to the gene-centered approach outline 
by Williams (1966), and made still more 
explicit by Dawkins (1976)” .
Does this mean that Maynard Smith and 
Szathmáry excluded (old) group selection? 
Not really! For Maynard Smith and Szath-
máry the gene-centered view is a heuristic 
perspective—“I find the gene-centered ap-
proach both mathema-tically simpler and 
causally more appropriate, but this may 
merely reflect the fact that I prefer micro-
scopic to holistic models: Maxwell-Boltz-
mann to classical thermodynamics, and 
Dawkins to Price’s equation” (Maynard 
Smith, 2002, p . 523)—, not an empirical hy-
pothesis concerning the path of evolution .
It is also illuminating here to recall what 
Williams wrote himself in 1996 (p . xii) in 
the preface to his 1966 reprinted book:
“A few years after 1966, I was being giv-
en credit for showing that the adapta-
tion concept was not usually applica-
ble at the population or higher levels, 
and that Wynne-Edwards’s thesis that 
group selection regularly leads to regu-
lation of population density by individu-
al restrains on reproduction was without 
merit . It also became fashionable to cite 
my work (sometimes, I suspect, by people 
who had not read it) as showing that ef-
fective selection above the individual lev-
el can be ruled out . My recollection, and 
my current interpretation of the text, es-
pecially of Chapter 4, indicates that this 
is a misreading . I concluded merely that 
group selection was not strong enough 
to produce what I termed biotic adapta-
tion: any complex mechanism clearly de-
signed to augment the success of a popu-
lation or a more inclusive group . A biotic 
adaptation would be characterized by or-
ganisms’ playing roles that would subor-
dinate their individual interests for some 
higher value, as in the often proposed 
benefit to the species” .
The question therefore is: do we have bi-
otic adaptations in the evolution of biologi-
cal complexity that need to be explained by 
group selection? Amazingly enough, the 
very origin of life may have required group 
selection!
Today every autonomous living system is 
cellular (prokaryotic or eukaryotic, uni- or 
multicellular) in nature, as advocated by the 
Schwann-Schleiden cell theory in the mid-
nineteenth century . A working definition of 
“minimal life” system is a chemical super-
system comprising three systems: a meta-
bolic network, template replication, and a 
boundary system (Gánti, 2003; Szathmáry 
et al., 2005) . A model that satisfies these cri-
teria is the “stochastic corrector model” 
(SCM; Szathmáry and Demeter, 1987; Zint-
zaras et al., 2002; Santos et al., 2003), which 
describes the dynamics of independent 
replicators (genes: chromosomes were a lat-
ter development in the origin of life) encap-
sulated in a reproductive vesicle or com-
partment (protocell) . The behavior of the 
(super-) system depends on a two-level se-
lection dynamics (figure 2) . First, there is 
within-compartment (among-replicator) se-
lection, where replicators compete among 
them within compartments to increase 
their relative shares (i .e ., “the immediate 
selective advantage” required for Maynard 
Smith and Szathmáry to explain the major 
evolutionary transitions) . Second, between-
compartment (among-protocell) selection 
on stochastically produced offspring var-
iants after protocell fission can rescue the 
population from extinction (favoring co-
operative molecules) . Since protocells in 
this model are groups of independent rep-
licating entities (genes), the SCM explicitly 
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invokes group (among-protocell) selection . 
On biological grounds the ingredient of 
group selection was automatically guar-
anteed once compartments met the criteria 
for “minimal life” . The SCM was advocated 
by Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995) 
since it opens great possibilities for contin-
ued evolution . For instance, it was specif-
ically used to model the evolutionary ori-
gin of chromosomes (Maynard Smith and 
Szathmáry, 1993), to study how the danger 
of information decay in primitive genetic 
systems could have been overcome (Zint-
zaras et al., 2002), to investigate issues bear-
ing on the origin of sex (Santos et al., 2003), 
and to test the potential effect of recombi-
nation to circumvent the crisis of informa-
tion transmission in early evolution (Santos 
et al., 2004) .
The moral here is clear: Maynard Smith 
(1964) advanced the “haystack model” to 
show the unlikelihood of (old) group se-
lection (although he did not dismiss it al-
together), but later relied upon group 
selection to understand some major evolu-
tionary transitions . In fact, in the preface 
to their book Maynard Smith and Szath-
máry (1995) acknowledge that the (incom-
plete) similarity between the haystack and 
the SCM was one of the impetuses behind 
writing it . If the SCM can be taken serious-
ly, we must conclude that group selection 
played a vital role in the origin of life . Obvi-
ously, this should not be taken to mean that 
(old) group selection is a widespread mech-
anism to explain cooperation . Perhaps the 
situation here is similar to that in the ori-
gin of eukaryotes: there is no doubt that mi-
tochondria and chloroplasts are descend-
ed from endosymbiotic events that may 
have occurred very few times throughout 
the history of life, but the consequences 
of these very unlikely events have clearly 
been spectacular .
EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY
Kin selection was not the only alternative 
explanation of cooperation that emerged 
out of discontent with traditional group se-
lection . Another idea, which could explain 
altruism among non-relatives, was the evo-
lutionary game theory introduced by May-
nard Smith and Price (1973) although close-
ly related ideas were developed by Trivers 
(1971) and Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) . Ev-
Figure 2. A “minimal life” model as depic-
ted by the SCM. Different templates (labeled 
by open and closed circles) contribute to the 
well being of the compartments (protocells) 
in that they catalyze steps of metabolism, 
for example. During protocell growth tem-
plates replicate at differential expected ra-
tes, but stochastically. Upon division there 
is chance assortment of templates into offs-
pring compartments. Stochastic replication 
and reassortment generate variation among 
protocells, on which natural selection at the 
compartment level can act and oppose (cor-
rect) internal deterioration due to within-cell 
competition.
  
growth division
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olutionary game theory means that the fit-
ness of the individuals is not constant, but 
depends on the relative frequencies of var-
ious strategies in the population; in other 
words, the optimal thing for an individu-
al to do critically depends on what others 
are doing at the same time (like in parlor 
games) . The outcome of the game is related 
to reproductive success, and the payoffs de-
termine fitness .
Trivers (1971) suggested that the evolu-
tion of cooperative behavior could be un-
derstood in terms of reciprocal aid giv-
en in repeated interactions between two 
partners . As discussed above, in a non-re-
peated Prisoner’s Dilemma it is best to de-
fect no matter which strategy is adopted 
by the other player . But if there are repeat-
ed encounters between the same two in-
dividuals, the idea “I help you and you 
help me” can lead to the evolution of co-
operation . Axelrod (1984) made some im-
portant contributions to debates about the 
conditions under which cooperation can 
emerge under repeated iterations from his 
computer tournaments . He invited game 
theorists and other social and behavio-
ral scientists familiar with the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma to submit strategies for a multi-
player tournament . In the first of these con-
tests each strategy was paired with itself, 
with a random strategy, and with each of 
the other submitted strategies: each strate-
gy pair playing two hundred rounds . Strat-
egies were scored according to the total 
number of points earned in all these pair-
ings, with 3 points each for mutual coop-
eration, a 5/0 split where one defected and 
one cooperated, and 1 point each if both de-
fected (i .e ., a record of mutual cooperation 
throughout two hundred plays of pairing 
earned 600 points; while a record of 1,000 
points could be attained by continuously 
defecting when the partner played coop-
eration in all plays, thus earning 0 points) . 
How should a rational player have select-
ed a strategy, assuming all other players are 
rational?
Because both players know that the game 
will end after two hundred rounds, we can 
use backward induction . Thus, there is no 
incentive to cooperate in the last round 
because the same analysis applies as for 
the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma . Since 
we “know” what will happen on the last 
round, defection on the first-to-last round is 
also the “rational” approach to take . Since 
we also “know” this, defection is the cor-
rect move on the second-to-last round, and 
so for . The only strict Nash equilibrium is 
“always defect” (ALLD) . However, the win-
ning strategy, submitted by game theorist 
Anatol Rapoport, was “tit-for-tat” (TFT, 
which cooperates in the first stage and 
then does what the other player has done 
in the previous round) . Why did this strat-
egy perform so well? The reason is simple: 
even though ALLD wins TFT in individual 
pairings, the aggregate score of the former 
strategy is meager . When paired with TFT, 
ALLD wins on the first play but after that 
there is a continuous defection (TFT scores 
199 and ALLD scores 204) . When ALLD is 
paired with ALLD, both will receive a score 
of 200 at the end . When TFT is paired with 
TFT, their final score will be 600 . Thus, the 
results of this tournament seem to suggest 
that cooperation can indeed evolve by di-
rect reciprocity .
 But there are two problems with Axel-
rod’s original tournaments . The first is that 
in real-world situations, unlike in an error-
free digital universe, individuals incur in 
mistakes (Nowak and Sigmund, 1994) . In 
the presence of mistakes, two TFT players 
can achieve a low payoff . A single mistake 
moves the game from mutual cooperation 
to alternating between cooperation and 
defection, and a second mistake can lead 
to mutual defection (TFT cannot correct 
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mistakes) . But even if we stick to the er-
ror-free digital universe, a second prob-
lem arises when interpreting the results . 
Both Hamilton’s inclusive fitness and Triv-
ers’ reciprocal altruism as in the iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma rely fundamentally on 
the same principle: the positive assortment 
of helping behaviors (Fletcher and Zwick, 
2006) . This can perhaps be easily under-
stood using Hamilton’s (1975) mating pool 
mode of reproduction (figure 1) .
Assume the simplest situation of ran-
domly formed temporary groups, with 2 in-
dividuals that interact in the one-shot Pris-
oner’s Dilemma game and then are pooled 
back to the global population . The process 
is repeated again for successive “genera-
tions” (encounters) of the game . Assume a 
population with the two strategies, ALLD 
and TFT, initially at the same frequency . As 
indicated earlier, the outcome of the game 
is related to reproductive success, and the 
payoffs (the same as those given by Axel-
rod) determine fitness . At “generation 1” 
three different groups are formed: ALLD-
ALLD, ALLD-TFT, and TFT-TFT at frequen-
cies 0 .25, 0 .5, and 0 .25, respectively . It is easy 
to see that after the first interaction the av-
erage payoff of ALLD is 0 .5 × 1 + 0 .5 × 5 = 3 
(i .e ., in ALLD-ALLD groups both partners 
will be scored 1 and in ALLD-TFT groups 
ALLD will be scored 5), and that of TFT is 
0 .5 × 0 + 0 .5 × 3 = 1 .5 . The scores at “genera-
tion 2” (and at later generations) are some-
what more difficult to calculate because 
TFT is a conditional cooperator . It means 
that after the first encounter with TFT it 
will continue cooperating, but after the first 
encounter with ALLD it will defect . With-
out going into the details, a simple compu-
ter program shows that eventually ALLD 
replaces TFT, so defection prevails . This is 
exactly what Hamilton (1975) concluded: 
with random group formation (random en-
counters at each generation) altruism can-
not progress, and positive selection of altru-
ism is only possible when altruists tend to 
settle with altruists . Note that under pure-
ly positive assortment, only two groups are 
formed at “generation 1”: ALLD-ALLD and 
TFT-TFT at frequencies 0 .5 and 0 .5, respec-
tively . It then becomes clear that TFT wins 
because it will have a higher score than 
ALLD . By letting TFT-TFT play for two hun-
dred rounds in a row, Axelrod’s computer 
tournaments guaranteed positive assort-
ment and cooperation succeeded . In sum-
mary, reciprocal altruism does not seem to 
be fundamentally different from inclusive 
fitness or multilevel selection .
WHY DO HUMANS COOPERATE?
Kin selection can explain why coopera-
tion in the animal world is largely associ-
ated with family life (although a number of 
authors have questioned the primarily rel-
evance of the relatedness component in the 
evolution of eusociality; Gadagkar, 2001; 
Wilson and Hölldobler, 2005) . However, hu-
man behavior is unique in that cooperation 
occurs in large societies composed of many 
unrelated individuals . It is unlikely that re-
ciprocal altruism might explain close coop-
eration in moderately large groups of a few 
hundred or a few thousand people (not to 
speak of millions in our large-scale socie-
ties) since most encounters between unre-
lated individuals will happen only once or 
a very few times during a lifespan . For in-
stance, even in the relatively small network 
of scientific co-authorship (collaboration), 
there is a “small world” component—name-
ly, the tendency for scientists to publish 
with only a few fellows (Albert and Bara-
bási, 2002) . Human societies are thus an in-
teresting special case to study the evolution 
of cooperation .
It is essential to summarize here the con-
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tribution of game theory to the design of 
experiments beyond the Prisoner’s Dilem-
ma aimed at understanding how individu-
als behave when engaged in strategic inter-
actions . Perhaps the single most important 
point to make is that both altruistic coopera-
tion and altruistic punishment (helping oth-
ers at a cost to oneself) are often observed, 
particularly when individuals face a social 
dilemma . The reasons why we observe ex-
tensive cooperation in humans are the sub-
ject of some speculation, but “they come 
down to the plausible insight that human 
social life is so complex, and the rewards 
for prosocial behavior so distant and in-
distinct, that adherence to general rules of 
propriety, including the strict control over 
such deadly sins of anger, avarice, gluttony, 
and lust is individually fitness-enhancing” 
(Gintis, 2008, p . 50) . In all the games de-
scribed below subjects are anonymous to 
each other, they are college students who 
are recruited by bulletin board and news-
paper announcement, and they are paid re-
al money . They are instructed to fully un-
derstand the rules and the payoffs of the 
games . A more comprehensive account can 
be found in Gintis (2008, chap . 3) .
Ultimatum game
A player called the “proposer” is given 
a sum of money, say €10, and is instruct-
ed to give the second player, called the “re-
ceiver”, any amount from €1 to €10 . The re-
sponder can either accept or reject the offer . 
The catch is that if the responder rejects the 
offer, neither receives anything . The Nash 
equilibrium is to accept the minimum 
amount, so a “rational” proposer will give 
€1 and a “rational” receiver will accept the 
offer . What happens in fact is that propos-
ers routinely offer responders a substantial 
share (50% being the modal offer), and re-
sponders frequently reject offers below 30% . 
These experiments have been run in vari-
ous countries around the world, including 
some where the amount of money at stake 
is substantial, and the results are similar . 
Apparently most people prefer nothing to 
something that is perceived as unfair, and 
punish the proposer accordingly .
Dictator game
Here a player called the “dictator” re-
ceives a sum of money but, in contrast to 
an ultimatum game, after offering, the dic-
tator keeps whatever amount of money he 
does not choose to give to the recipient . Ob-
viously, a “rational” dictator will give noth-
ing to the recipient . The results show that 
although some subjects will indeed keep all 
of the money, not all will . Actually, a fre-
quent outcome in some recent experiments 
was to split the money down with offers var-
ying between 50% and 0%, with about 20% 
of subjects keeping all the money . These re-
sults provide clear confirmation of altruis-
tic and “irrational” (from a game theoreti-
cal analysis) behavior among humans .
Public goods game
This is an n-person game that typically 
involves a group of subjects each of which 
is given an initial sum of money, say €10, 
and told they can either keep it (“private ac-
count”) or deposit it in a group (“common”) 
account . The experimenter then increas-
es the common account by, say, doubling 
it and then equally distributes the result-
ing amount of money among the group . 
The best solution for the group is for eve-
ryone to put €10, enabling each subject to 
double the initial quantity . But the unique 
Nash equilibrium for each player is to put 
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nothing, in which case everyone ends up 
with the original amount . Each individ-
ual following the Nash strategy hopes to 
keep his or her private account and free 
ride on the voluntary contributions of the 
rest . Contributing to the common account 
is risky since, in the worst case of only one 
contributor, this (altruistic) subject will end 
up with substantially less money than the 
initial €10 . When the game is played for a 
number of rounds, the results show that 
the average initial contribution of the indi-
viduals to the common account continual-
ly decreases along the time period involved 
(say ten rounds), clearly indicating that co-
operation declines . However, when coop-
erators are given the opportunity to pun-
ish defectors, cooperation is sustained or 
even increases during the game . These ex-
periments give some credibility to the sug-
gestion that altruistic punishment may be 
an important ingredient to sustaining co-
operation in human societies (e .g ., Fehr 
and Gächter, 2002; Boyd et al., 2003; Rock-
enbach and Milinski, 2006), although there 
is a huge cross-societal variation (see Her-
rmann et al., 2008) .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Strong reciprocity theorists advocate that 
most people do genuinely care about the 
welfare of others, and we agree . However, 
the role of group selection in human evolu-
tion is open to strong criticisms . Darwin’s 
potential solution for social groups to func-
tion as an adaptive evolutionary unit (Dar-
win, 1871, p . 166; see Introduction) is a two-
sided coin . The “nice” face is within-group 
cooperation (altruism), but the other side 
is hostility towards individuals from oth-
er groups (“parochialism”) . Darwin thus 
recognized war as a powerful evolution-
ary force that might foster social solidari-
ty among fellow members of one’s group . 
Hamilton’s speculation about how this 
could occur were discussed in the same pa-
per in which he introduced Price’s approach 
to understand the relative merits that indi-
vidual and group selection mechanisms 
have on the evolution of cooperation (Ham-
ilton, 1975); also known as Hamilton’s “Fas-
cist paper” (Hamilton, 1996, pp . 316-317):
“Robert Trivers was later to refer to the 
article that I contributed to Fox’s volume 
as my ‘Fascist paper’ . I believe he was re-
ferring not mainly to his own impres-
sion but rather to what others were say-
ing about it and particularly to one strong 
response by a noted anthropologist, S . L . 
Washburn, in which, singling my paper 
out of the whole volume, he called it ‘re-
ductionist, racist, and ridiculous’ . Wash-
burn obviously didn’t like the whole 
thing but focused his objection on some 
of my more speculative paragraphs con-
cerning the warlike propensities of pas-
toral people and the possible involve-
ment of these in current trends in the 
histories of Old World civilizations…
 Be that as it may, whether my paper 
really is racist or absurd I will leave to 
the reader’s judgment and just comment 
that I have hardly changed my opinions 
and certainly haven’t with regard to what 
Washburn indicated as the most offend-
ing passage” .
We are clearly moving on shaky grounds 
here, but cannot oversee the empirical im-
portance of both altruism and hostility to 
members of other groups . A recent game-
theoretic analysis suggests that under con-
ditions likely to have been experienced by 
late Pleistocene and early Holocene hu-
mans, both altruism and parochialism 
could have evolved jointly by promoting 
group conflict . This coevolution apparently 
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helps explain why group boundaries have 
such a powerful influence on human be-
havior (Choi and Bowles, 2007) . Choi and 
Bowles are cautious enough and on page 
640 stress that “we have not shown that a 
warlike genetic predisposition exists, on-
ly that should one exist, it might have co-
evolved with altruism and warfare in the 
way we have described” .
We will not question here the results of 
this work, or Bowles’ (2006) empirically- 
based support for Darwin’s argument that 
a possible explanation for the evolution of 
human altruism is that groups with more 
altruists survive when groups compete 
among them . It should be stressed, how-
ever, that the definition of altruism they 
used is relative to the local group, and not 
to the population as a whole . This leads to 
the confusing situation where cooperation 
can be favored because it provides a direct 
benefit to the cooperator . This issue is re-
lated to the previously discussed difference 
between Hamilton’s vs . Sober and Wilson’s 
definitions of altruism . A detailed analysis 
of this problem and how the previous con-
clusions can potentially change would be 
extremely useful .
Our final remark relates to the tricky 
question at the end of the introduction: 
Should we punish Russia for the hostile act 
against Georgia? To some commentators 
Georgia’s invasion could lead the World to 
a similar state of affairs than those during 
the Cold War . It thus might be interesting 
to realize here that superpower relations at 
that time were considered by some as a se-
quential rather than a simultaneous move 
in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game: either play-
er had the option of moving first in an even-
tual nuclear conflagration (the defect-defect 
Nash equilibrium) . In this case, the best op-
tion was a first strike . Few people are aware 
that John von Neumann (the father of game 
theory) and Bertrand Russell both advocat-
ed a first strike: “we attack at one o’clock (it 
is now 12:59), and the enemy is either too 
devastated, too demoralized, or too ration-
al to strike back (defect-cooperate) . But if for 
whatever reason … the attack provokes re-
taliation, nuclear exchange (defect-defect) is 
still preferable to an unprovoked attack (co-
operate-defect)” (Field, 2001, p . 169) . Would 
this outcome have been without a dramatic 
cost? One cannot avoid thinking that some-
times it may be a relief to know that politi-
cians are irrational!
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